The War in South Ossetia, pt. 1

With historically rooted interests in the Caucasus, Russia has hardly played the role of a neutral peacekeeper in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Peter Doran highlights this point in this World Politics Review piece, saying:

“Russia has leveraged its status as peacekeeper to assert increased control over Georgia's separatist enclaves. While the U.N. and Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) worked to reach a final settlement in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the international community, including the United States, engaged Russia as a mediator rather than a spoiler in the peace process. Indeed, Russia has gained more by perpetuating these frozen conflicts vis-à-vis Georgia than acting as a good faith party to any final peace.”

Georgia fell for the bait, entering South Ossetia to reassert its control of the breakaway region. If Saakashvili would have paused and allowed for the status quo to “win” back the separatist breakaway republics, the isolationist policies and demands of Tskhinvali would have eventually risen to a breaking point. From this standpoint, Georgia acted “in defense” as to avoid the “peaceful” disintegration of the de facto Georgian state. Given his dilemma, however, it would have been difficult for the Saakashvili government to expect lasting results from an abrupt campaign to “restore constitutional order” on 7 August.

The next day, the Russian air force responded to Georgia’s move by bombing strategic military facilities in Georgia. Units of the 58th Russian army enter South Ossetian territory with the declared objective of assisting the Russian peacekeeping, reaching the suburbs of Tskhinvali in the evening. President Dmitry Medvedev announced that the Russian Federation will defend its citizens in South Ossetia – this was made easier by the fact that the majority of South Ossetians have been issued Russian passports. The capital of the breakaway republic, seized by Russian troops, was heavily attacked in the fighting and many buildings destroyed.

By 10 August, the Russian army plowed through sovereign Georgian territory to Gori, where routed Georgian troops have fled. The Russian Black Sea Fleet, stationed in Ukraine, blockaded the Georgian coastline and lands at Abkhazian ports. The next day, 9,000 Russian soldiers in Abkhazia augment the peacekeeping mission by destroying military installations in sovereign Georgian territory, including the Black Sea port of Poti – home to major oil export infrastructure.

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The overt relationship between the Russian-Georgia war and Ukraine is the informational campaign waged by all sides. 2,000 deaths were immediately reported by the Russian press. Extreme rhetoric was employed by all sides. Saakhashvili, who has a tendency to be sandwiched between a Georgian and EU flag during press conferences, compared it to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russian media labeled Georgia an “aggressor” and the country responsible for “the genocide of the Ossetian nation,” and Russia “forcing peace” on Georgia. President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity repeatedly called Georgia a “fascist” country. CNN reported that “Russia invaded Georgia” while skimming past the fine print – that Georgia granted permission to allow Russian troops in South Ossetia under the 1994 ceasefire agreement (in Abkhazia, U.N. Resolution 937 (1994) granted Russian peacekeepers international recognition alongside the U.N.'s observation mission).

The war served as a major test for NATO and the EU under the French presidency. The Russian side immediately rejected a ceasefire agreement proposed by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in Moscow on 11 August, ignoring calls from the EU and NATO to stop military operations. Only by 13 August was the EU plan supported by President Medvedev. After doing very little to integrate Georgia with the European Union under the auspices of the European Neighbourhood Policy, EU promised that it was committed to a lasting peace in Georgia. It seems that in the future, the EU will only act to resolve “frozen conflicts” after they thaw into a hot war.

While Moscow freely snubs international pressure, the Kremlin drummed up a case of war crimes against Saakashvili in the Hague on 11 August. The following day, Ossetian paramilitary troops begin targeting the Georgian population, which fleed South Ossetia.

On 19 August, the North Atlantic Council temporarily suspended cooperation under the Russia-NATO Council until the end of the occupation. Angering Russia, NATO established a NATO-Georgia Council to step up relations. In the following days, Russia responded by suspending joint military cooperation with NATO. This came after Warsaw inked the MD shield with Washington. More directly, Chancellor Merkel reaffirmed Georgia’s NATO ambitions and that its clear path to the Euro-Atlantic alliance remained on track.

Undoubtedly, NATO-Russia relations have reached a concrete breaking point. The writing was on the wall since the Bucharest summit, when Moscow vowed to do anything possible to prevent Georgia's NATO entry. Given that NATO expansion is the primary US policy for East Europe, it is possible that Russia's actions in South Ossetia were timed explicitly to prevent Georgia's NATO bid rather than a step to support a pro-Moscow separatist region with little economic value to the Kremlin.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said on 19 August that in addition to supplying aid to the Georgian army, it would dispatch counter-cyberterrorism specialists to Georgia. This is in response to a number of recent cyber attacks against Baltic countries.

Georgia and Ukraine are often mentioned in the same breath, despite the vast differences between the two countries. Russia has already received permission to conduct harsh policies in the post-Soviet region, especially with energy relations. According to EDM, Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kostyantyn Yeliseyev was the first high-ranking foreign official to arrive in Georgia on a peacemaking mission stating in Tbilisi that Ukraine was ready to mediate in talks between Georgia and South Ossetia – later backtracking on a statement that Ukraine could provide military aid to Georgia.

The effects of Russia’s propaganda campaign and future occupation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia are soon to be felt in Ukraine. Vitrenko, CPU and PR activists have long criticized NATO for greedily plotting to put American boots on post-Soviet soil. Ukrainian voters sympathizing with this view will have to reckon with images of Russian occupiers in breakaway regions. While a NATO base in Ukraine seems like a distant prospect, it is certain that a Russian base will be installed in South Ossetia, according to Anatoly Nogovitsyn who is deputy head of the Russian armed forces’ general staff.

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On the U.S. campaign front, the conflict was seen as a “test” for John McCain and Barack Obama’s future foreign policy. Not surprisingly, both candidates hammered home the same message – Russia overstepped its boundaries and Georgia must retain its sovereignty– albeit with different rhetoric. According to a Washington Post-ABC News poll, a majority of respondents believe that McCain would fare better on international affairs and an “unexpected major crisis.” Specifically on US-Russia relations, 46% of respondents think that McCain is a better candidate, over Obama’s 41%.

The Washington Post on 24 August went so far as to say, “the die may have been cast for [Democratic Vice Presidential candidate Joseph] Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when Russian forces invaded Georgia this month ... Once the tanks rolled, the weight of evidence shifted toward someone who would raise no question in the area of national security.”

The concept, however, that the Georgia-Russia crisis will serve as a bellwether for the US presidential election may prove misleading. The time between August and early November is vast in U.S. political campaigning. Coverage of the conflict has already evaporated from the headlines and relegated to the back pages of the major US papers. Both candidates essentially repeated the State Department line; on this particular issue, style hardly played more of a role than substance. Finally, the U.S. has pumped $1.7 billion in aid to Georgia since 1991. It is unlikely that Washington will pull out of its investment in the region.

At a rally in Tbilisi attended by 150,000 people on 12 August, leaders of the pro-US "axis" in Central East Europe -- Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Ukraine and Latvia -- attended and offered Georgia full support in its conflict with Russia. The signing of the missile defense between Washington and Warsaw coincided with the war, opening a new front of conflict between the West and Russia (much more on this later).

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President Saakashvili announces that Georgia will quit the CIS, declare Abkhazia and South Ossetia occupied territories, and withdraw its consent for the stationing of the Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia under the aegis of the UN. Just as Russia promised to block Georgia’s entry into NATO, Georgia will block Russia’s aspirations to join the WTO. This move will further isolate Russia.