1.27.2006
Gazerbaijan
With space-age spy rocks, "European imperialism in football", and now a Sakaashvili rose-colored conspiracy theory in overdrive, paranoia in the former Soviet Union seems to be an upward trend. And a lucrative one, too. Naturally, Gleb Pavlovsky felt left out. In the 23 January issue of Izvestia (50% owned by Gazprom), the pundit called Ukraine the “producer and world supplier of fear of Russia." A week ago, it was the American press and CIA-funded NGOs.
With the array of espionage, political technology, and informational warfare taking place, there are other developments at hand that I decided to look into...
The Georgian authorities have raised the question that Russia should fulfill its promise and supply three million cubic meters of gas per day to Azerbaijan...Earlier, the Azerbaijani Industry Ministry had denied Georgia’s statement that Russia used the territory of Azerbaijan for gas transit to Georgia. The Azerbaijani Industry Ministry denied this information as untrue because Azerbaijan had never signed a transit agreement either with Gazprom or Gasexport, the Azerbajnian ministry said in a statement (ITAR TASS, 27 Jan).
Although Azerbaijan initially began delivering supplies of 3 million cubic meters of gas per day [to Georgia] following the disruption of the main gas pipeline from Russia, damage to a gas compressor station on the Russian side of the Azerbaijani-Russian border on 24 January cut supply to 2.5 million cubic meters (RFE/RL, 26 Jan).
Pipelines were blown up in North Ossetia and a gas compressor was disrupted as well. Coincidence? I will leave it up to the conspiracy theorists... The developments in Georgia, and particular in Azerbaijan, have broad implications for Gazprom and global "energy security." Given high world prices for natural gas, Azerbaijan’s estimated gas reserves of 35 trillion cubic feet are being developed. The Shah Deniz fields (among the newest gas finds in the last 20 years) are generating the bulk of gas production in Azerbaijan. Gas output increased 16% in 2005, a welcoming sign for the sector’s potential. The State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) is channeling $224 million into exploration, and pipelines, including the $29 million Bakhar-Nefyaniye Kamni pipeline. These efforts will eventually double gas exports from the Gunashli field by 2010. Currently, six consortiums of Azeri and foreign companies are exploring the country’s gas fields.
As Russia gears up for its G8 presidency with "global energy security" as the top priority, it is having severe problems in its own backyard. This started not with "Gas Wars 2006", but in May 2005 when the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was inaugurated - a $3.6 billion mega project supported by the United States. To make matters more clear: major shareholders in the BTC include: BP (30%), SOCAR (25%) and other U.S. and European companies (45%). Stretching 1,760 kilometers, the BTC is Azerbaijan’s and Kazakhstan's energy export corridor. 400,000 barrels of Caspian oil per day transit the BTC pipeline, bypassing the congested and narrow Bosporus Strait shipping lanes. Most importantly, every drop of oil bypasses Russia. Shipments from the BTC will account for 25% of new supply for global markets in 2006, and Caspian oil is a strong entrant along with the emerging African oil producers. Azerbaijan’s share of transit revenues via BTC are expected to be between $100-140 billion over the lifetime of the pipeline. This translates to billions in losses in transit fees for Russia.
So what does this have to do with Gazprom?
Just as the BTC pipeline revitalized the oil sector, the milestone South Caucasus Gas (SCP) pipeline will firmly establish Azerbaijan as a leading gas exporting nation. Costing around $1 billion, SCP is in its final stages of construction. Constructed by the BTC Pipeline Company, the new energy corridor runs parallel to the BTC pipeline and will create cutting-edge gas export infrastructure from the Shah Deniz fields to the Turkish gas distribution system. Spanning 690 kilometers, the SCP will soon transport up to 7 billion cubic meters of gas annually, with the possibility of doubling this capacity at a future stage. As Azerbaijan is finishing its section of the pipeline, this ambitious project will allow Azeri gas to reach world markets by autumn 2006.
Although Azeri gas is a drop in the bucket of total future European gas consumption, the SCP it is one sign that Russian interests in Eurasia are being shored up by countries continually left in the cold by Gazprom. Russia as leader of the G8 may better off reestablishing its priorities in the region rather than wondering worrying about the "mutual downfall of love between Slavic peoples".
1.20.2006
Przewalski horses

i went to the zoo in dc and throat sang kargyraa to a przewalski's horse. he responded well to the songs of his ancestral homeland. they are extinct in the wild but they are thriving in Chernobyl. sounds like a strugatsky brothers novel.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Przewalski
http://adoraresponds.blogspot.com/2005/12/if-it-glows-it-grows.html
http://www.kiddofspeed.com/chapter8.html
1.19.2006
Cold snap
In Yaroslavl, staffers at a traveling circus reportedly fed elephants a mixture of vodka and water to keep them warm. Keepers at the Lipetsk zoo gave monkeys wine for the same reason (RFE/RL, 19 Jan 06).
And talk about shrinkage, check out Yushchie in his speedos. What a sexy beast. (Thanks, Neeka and Lyuda for the link...)
Electricity consumption across [Russia] reportedly hit 146,000 megawatts on Wednesday - the highest figure since the collapse of the Soviet Union 15 years ago. Italy has meanwhile said it has had to tap into its gas reserves to account for a 5% drop in supplies from Russia. Italian Industry Minister Claudio Scajola has summoned a crisis meeting of energy firms to debate the issue. Reports say Russian gas flows to parts of Europe have fallen by as much as 20%. Gazprom has said it is fulfilling its contractual obligations, but is unable to supply excess amounts of gas (BBC, 19 Jan 06).
Late last Monday, the Russian energy giant's CEO Alexei Miller and Moldovagaz director general Gennady Abashkin signed contracts on gas supplies to Moldova in the first quarter of 2006. Until recently, the republic has been literally freezing, because Gazprom suspended gas supplies after the parties had failed to agree on gas prices. Chisinau will buy Russian gas at $110 per 1,000 cu m until March, instead of the $160 initially demanded by Gazprom (RIA Novosti, 18 Jan 06).
Moldova's gas supplies from Russia were suspended for more than two weeks. Note that Moldova, the poorest country in Europe, will pay more per m3 than Ukraine.
1.17.2006
Energy Security
Nigerian militants threatened to attack oil companies in coming days, Sky News reported today, after sabotage reduced the country's output since Jan. 11. (Ibid.)
Venezuelan Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez stated on Friday that his country supports cuts in quotas. President Hugo Chavez hinted that the drop could be used as an oil tool against the United States as oil prices will soar. President Chavez accused the Americans of persistent efforts to “topple” hi” and threatened to suspend oil supplies to the U.S. market. “We send them 1.5 million barrel each day. What will happen if I announce tomorrow that not a single tanker will reach the United States? How high will the barrel price skyrocket? Up to $100, I guess but war is war,” Hugo Chavez said. (Kommersant, 16 Jan 06)
Russia is not the only one using "energy as a weapon" and "energy as a political tool." With all the attention on Ukraine, more pressing questions should be answered. What is the U.S., Europe and China going to do about "global energy security", considering they barely produce what they (over)consume? How will Russia contribute to "global energy security" during its chairmanship of the G8?
I expect business as usual, like Ukraine's continued gaz guzzling.
1.13.2006
Press Wars
Если продолжать аналогию с Веймарской республикой, которая, как известно, закончилась диктатурой, то же ожидает и Украину. И наиболее, на мой взгляд, вероятная кандидатура на место диктатора - это единственный мужчина среди украинских политиков - Юлия Тимошенко. (Regnum, 11 Jan 2006, http://www.regnum.ru/news/570907.html).
Someone isn't reading the Western papers. This is what happens when Gazprom controls the press and "experts" regurgitate historical vindications.
1.10.2006
Smells Like a Lack of Team Spirit...part 2
Opposition lawmaker Nestor Shufrych, of the Social Democratic Party (United), acknowledged that the parliament's resolution had no legal power. "Yes, we know that we cannot dissolve the Cabinet ... we are familiar with the Constitution," Shufrych told reporters.
According to [Justice Minister Serhiy] Holovaty, legal chaos could envelop the country because President Viktor Yushchenko no longer has the right to appoint a new prime minister, and the lower chamber of parliament, the Supreme Rada, has drafted no laws for electing a new premier and government. The constitutional reform that empowered the Supreme Rada to fire and appoint government came into force January 1, but the bills outlining the appointment procedure have not been passed yet.
This means, dorohi druzi, that Shufrich and Shkil are on the same page. The Ya-Yu "pact" looks pretty tame in comparison. Rest assured that Shkil, the far right-wing leader of rabid nationalist organization UNA-UNSO, is looking out for the "national interests" of Ukraine. Instead of helping plunge Ukraine into crisis, maybe he should explain how continuing to feed off of Russian gas subsidies will protect Ukrainian sovereignty...
****
Ukrainian First Deputy Health Minister Serhiy Berezhnov said in theVerkhovna Rada on 10 January that there is "a possibility of mass[bird-flu] infection among humans" in the country. "The situationtoday is under control but it is rather threatening," Berezhnov added. President Viktor Yushchenko introduced a state of emergency insome areas of the Crimean Peninsula for nearly four weeks in December in connection with an outbreak of bird flu there. (RFE/RL 10 Jan 06).
A no-confidence motion was backed by 250 deputies in the 450-seat parliament, angry over the deal with Moscow which will force Ukraine to pay nearly twice as much for its gas imports this year.
Yekhanurov will remain as acting prime minister until President Viktor Yushchenko names a new premier. Ukraine is due to hold a parliamentary election in March.
Former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, sacked by Yushchenko last September after the partnership that swept them to power in Ukraine's Orange Revolution turned sour, was the driving force behind the no-confidence vote.
Tymoshenko is competing against Yushchenko's allies in the March 26 parliamentary polls, and has seized every opportunity to criticize the government of technocrat Yekhanurov which replaced her.
She has vowed to fight the five-year gas deal signed by Moscow and Kiev last Thursday after a dispute which peaked over the New Year when Russia's gas monopoly Gazprom cut supplies to its ex-Soviet neighbor for two days.
Tymoshenko joined forces with opposition parties representing the pro-Moscow administration ousted at the end of 2004 in the binding no-confidence vote, which required a simple majority.
***
"The long-term 'energy security' risk, then, is less that of an energy tyrant holding the world to ransom, than that of unforeseeable short-term disasters or upheavals (which might, of course, involve tyrants). It is less of interrupted supplies than of highly volatile oil and gas prices, buffeted by hurricanes, workers' strikes and the chaos of an unpredictable world...
...Mr Chávez has used cheap oil and refined products as 'solidarity' to secure the loyalty of countries in the region. Those working against Mr Chávez have been threatened with a cut in supplies. . . Strangely, perhaps, consumers can learn a comforting lesson from all this. For all his mischief-making, even a populist like Mr Chávez has never looked like cutting supplies to what Venezuela calls its 'fundamental market' in America..."
--Economist, 7 Jan 06http://economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5356596
1.04.2006
Winners and Losers
Russia will sell gas to the Rosukrenergo consortium at US$230 dollars per 1,000 cubic meters, then Rosukrenergo will mix it with cheaper Turkmen gas and sell it to Ukraine on the border at US$95 dollars per 1,000 c.m. Gazprom will sell its gas at the price it initially offered, meaning that Russia will chalk this up to political victory. The JV will become "exclusive distributor'' for gas imports to Ukraine, lining the pockets of Ukrainian and Russian oligarchs. It seems everybody should be happy.
The doubling of prices will raise Ukraine's gas bill by US$7 billion annually, about a tenth of GDP. I suggest that Yushchenko and Co. figure out a solution ASAP, i.e. more privatizations, slashing corruption, and sticking his head out of the sand.
Aleksei Miller said "[The] agreements provide an additional guarantee for the security of European gas exports and serves as a good base for developing cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in the gas sphere on market terms." It would help if Russia and Ukraine were full-fledged market economies first.
A piece from the Guardian reminds us that: "Today two Latin American producer states are using energy as a tool in standing up to the 'imperial' west. Venezuela's Hugo Chavez has threatened to interrupt oil shipments to the US and is tapping the state's burgeoning oil revenues to win political support. In Bolivia, Evo Morales recently swept to power on promises to take back control of gas reserves from multinationals."
The Russians forgot that in deepest darkest selo, people lack heat and water anyway.
1.02.2006
Gas Wars: The Empire Strikes Back

It can be said now, officially, that nothing has changed in Ukrainian-Russian relations since independence. This statement is not based upon cynicism or disappointment, but rather the enduring tendency for the same tricks, tactics and games to be exploited by politicians at opportune times. The politicization of the current “Gas War” between Ukraine and Russia will not result in the implementation of any constructive market-driven policies as much as a continuation of hardball politics, nationalist pandering, and lucrative inside contracts that lubricate bilateral ties. There is nothing new here. The lynchpin, however, is the March elections. The machine never stopped juggernauting after 26 December 2004, it only hibernated while Ukraine went through its “bitter oranges” split in September.
With the onslaught of a bitter winter and another potentially divisive election, Russia’s supermegamonopoly Gazprom felt compelled to renegotiate its gas prices with Ukraine. In December, Gazprom demanded that Ukraine pay US$230 per thousand cubic meters -- more than four times the current bargain-basement subsidized price of US$50 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas. Yushchenko offered that Ukraine should pay US$80 per unit -- well below market price, but higher than before. But this wasn’t enough for a US$36 billion company that controls 25% of the world’s natural gas. As a New Year gift, Russia turned off the spigots. S novym godom.
PLAYING HARDBALL
Surprisingly, Turkmenistan supplies half of Ukraine’s gas needs. Starting in 2006, Ukraine will pay $60 per 1,000 cubic meters from Turkmenistan, an increase on the $44 paid for 2005 shipments (RFE/RL 27 Dec 05). Because Russia controls the transportation of Turkmen gas, Gazprom has also suspended shipments of Turkmen gas to Ukraine breaching the two country's bilateral agreements. Unlike Putin and Gazprom CEO Aleksii Miller, Turkmenbashi realizes that his country is landlocked. If the Father of All Turkmens demanded market prices from ex-Soviet transit states, manifold problems would occur in collecting revenue for ice palaces in the desert, gilded museums, etc. Likewise, Gazprom is increasing gas prices across the board in Armenia, Georgia and the Baltic States. This is fair, considering that Moscow doesn't need these "uncooperative" partners anymore.
THE EUROPEAN BLUFF
Around half of Europe’s gas supply originates in Russia, and Europe gets 80 percent of its Russian natural gas via Ukrainian pipelines. On Monday, Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine, but Ukraine was supposed to allow Europe's share to keep flowing. The chief European importers of Russian gas are Germany, Italy and France, which would have to draw down reserves or seek alternative supplies if there were a major supply disruption. Energy ministers of Germany, Italy, France and Austria have made a joint appeal to Moscow and Kyiv to ensure a steady flow of gas despite the stand-off.
Because of the Ukrainian deadlock, German and other European officials have criticized Gazprom’s credibility and reliability as a European supplier. With Europe's cold snap, European officials may reassess Europe's vast dependency on Russian gas. German paper Die Welt made this assessment: "For seven years, Schroeder narrowed the German energy strategy on Russia… It is now in the hands of the new federal government [Merkel] to secure sources of natural gas for Germany that are outside Russia. The example of Ukraine should teach caution to all of Europe" (quoted from the Washington Post, 1 Jan 2006).
Larger European companies may experience another energy shock if the row continues. Hungary says natural gas imports from Russia have fallen by more than 40 percent. Austria's oil and gas group OMV says Russian supplies have fallen by about 33 percent. Slovakia, Croatia, and Romania say that Russian gas coming via Ukraine dropped by 30 percent on Monday. Italy, which gets about 30 percent of its gas from Russia, says that less gas is arriving but has stocks to last 15 days. Poland reports a 14 percent reduction in gas supplies since Russia cut off gas to Ukraine but is working to increase flows from Belarus. Poland's economy minister promised that households wouldn't be affected. Germany, which gets more than one-third of its gas from Russia, says it has stocks to last 75 days. French Industry Minister Francois Loos said Sunday "With the assurances that we have from the Russians, on the one hand, and with our policy of diversification of suppliers, there is no risk to supplies for France" (Wall Street Journal, 1 Jan 2006). Serbia, an Orthodox Slavic brother of Russia during 1999, is apparently greatly affected by gas shortages.
On 1 January 2006, Russia assumed the chairmanship of the G8, an organization comprised of market-driven democracies. Ironically, Russia is neither market-driven nor a democracy. Nonetheless, this high-profile position will be used to promote global "energy security." With the above energy shortages, Moscow has gotten off to a poor start in its G8 premiership.
No matter what happens, the Russian side will ensure that Ukraine is to blame. Gazprom insists that Ukraine is siphoning gas just as it did under Lazerenko and Co. According to Gazprom, the Yushchenko government is a disloyal subject, and should be punished. Sergei Kupriyanov, a Gazprom spokesman said "If such steps are not taken [to pay the demanded amount for gas], the responsibility for any possible worsening of Russian-Ukrainian relations in the gas sector and problems caused to European countries will rest solely with Ukraine." (quoted from Washington Post, 1 Jan 2006).
In August Mikhail Margelov, a Russian senator and top foreign-policy official stated: "Russia has for some time been providing politico-economic charity to these new states, feeding them from its hand and supplying them with cheap resources, without getting either real political loyalty or appreciable economic gains in return." (quoted from Wall Street Journal, 19 Dec 2005).
First, Russia does not fully recognize that it is overwhelmingly dependent on Ukraine for the continued delivery of its energy products to its main market of Europe. Without gas revenues from Europe, Russia fails to be a petrostate and fails to be worthy of a world power (or in the words of Dugin, a counterbalance to a unipolar world). On the one hand, the Kremlin is cutting the umbilical cord after nearly 15 years of independence. Ukraine, like Armenia and Georgia, are no longer needed as strategic political partners. On the other hand, Ukraine is obviously unable to pay market prices for gas and Russia is fully aware of this fact. Economic disaster in Ukraine, however, chalks up to political victory.
EFFECT ON THE POLITICAL SCENE
Divide and conquer has always plagued Ukrainian-Russian relations and the current situation is nothing short of a repeat. Unfortunately for Russia, divide and conquer has consistently backfired. Many contemporary commentators fail to remember the "Gas Wars" of 1993-4, when Russia disrupted supplies of Ukrainian gas only months before presidential elections. The Ukrainian leadership chose sovereignty over economic dependence-- Ukrainians froze through the harsh winter and maintained a level of economic independence.
Divide and conquer reared its head in 2003 over Tuzla Island, as nationalists on both sides made outlandish claims over a sand spit. The issue was again sovereignty and to resolve the border disputre, even Kuchma and Yanukovich were forced to back Ukrainian nationalist forces to protect territorial sovereignty.
Of course, 2004 is the prime example of lowly Ukraine's resiliance. Putin on TV, the extraneous 60th anniversary of the defeat of Fascism parade, and pandering to Russian speakers were extremely weak attempts to prevent an assertion of symbolic forms of national sovereignty. Alas, Russia got much more than it bargained for with the victory of Yushchenko.
But it is well-understood that the current gas spat is not based solely on the development of free market economies. The timing is grand: the coldest months of the year are coming as well as parliamentary elections in March. The propaganda machine (on both sides) is in full force and as any Ukrainian-Russian row, nationalism is flaring up. The notion of a “crisis” is much more easily exploited in the domain of politics and propaganda. The real crisis is not economic, but one of Russian-Ukrainian foreign policy, and the crisis of Russia's regional role after color revolutions.
Ukrainska Pravda reported a story where students and others in Moscow were persuaded to protest at an anti-Ukrainian rally clutching embarrassing quasi-nationalist placards like “We will not exchange gas for salo.” Not surprisingly, officials forced the protestors to attend the lackluster rallies. On the other side of the coin, the same news source called the current foreign policy row a “Jihad, sponsored by Russian government against post-revolutionary Ukraine” while encouraging concerned Ukrainians to write angry letters to the “main ideologist of the “Gas War” – Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.”
At best, the two examples represent the current state of civil society in the two countries: one grassroots and the other government-sanctioned. Donbass stations are reportedly blaming Gazprom, not Yushchenko for the sudden demand for higher gas prices. We won’t get into the media outlets that Gazprom owns...
Given that the political end of gas negotiations is meant to harm the Orange government, Russia may lose once again. Like in any other country, high heating costs are more important to voters than “market principles.” According to some individual accounts reported in the media, Ukrainians are blaming Russia rather than the Yushchenko government. Many of those thoroughly disappointed with the YuGov in November remember Ukraine's strong stance in previous conflicts, and how Ukraine fares considerably well after asserting its independence during rows with Russia.
Vitrenko and the Commumaniacs are naturally blaming Yushchenko for all of Ukraine’s problems. It’s always easier to complain, and the only solution they offer is to join Russia immediately-- a proposition abandoned by nearly all Ukrainians around 1994. Party of Regions may win big on a risky gamble. My hypothesis is that Gazprom never wanted Ukraine to pay US$240 per 1,000 cubic meters at all, but a price more around what is being charged to The Baltics, US$140. During talks, “friendly partners” would step in and “lower” the price of gas. Thus, Party of Regions would get credit for saving Ukraine from absorbent gas prices-- an excellent campaign pitch.
SOLUTIONS?
With Gas Wars 2005-6, loyal orangists are turning gas negotiations into a watershed of independence and sovereignty. Yushchenko and his supporters are hardly against raising prices of gas because this conforms to his ideological shift toward a European market economy. Optimists are looking at this as an opportunity to finally kickstart economic reforms, especially in the energy sector. Further successful privatizations could offset higher prices for gas (why won’t Yushchenko offer state-run behemoths such as Ukrtelekom for tender?).
Energy officials from EU member states are planning to hold an emergency meeting on 4 January. Instead of appeasing Gazprom, Ukraine needs to offer these European leaders clear-cut opportunities for investments, especially in the energy sector. As the largest country in Europe, Ukraine would be an ideal hub for renewable energy: solar and wind farms. As an added bonus, these investments would fulfill strict EU quotas for electricity production. Ukraine would be ahead of the game, while petrostate Russia will continue to be dependent on high oil and gas prices. Nothing more than a Eurasian Nigeria.
On a side note, Andrei Illarionov, Putin's economic advisor, abruptly resigned amidst the gas talks. He was seen as the only Kremlin official close to promoting liberal economics while openly criticizing the government. He said that "The Russian economy has radically changed in the past six years. It's not possible to conduct the policy of economic freedom in Russia... This finally became clear over the past two years" (Interfax, 27 Dec 05). Russia is set to become a Eurasian Nigeria, or perhaps an Asian Saudi Arabia pumping energy to China and Japan. Ukraine has no role in this geoeconomic strategy.
Under Putin, Russia's fundamental mission is to be a stable and indispensable supplier of energy products to Western Europe, but little else. Ukraine’s role in solidifying this power is essential. It is no secret, however, that Russia has turned into a corporatist model dominated by monopolistic quasi-state controlled corporations like Gazprom. Putin, a bureaucrat, does not have Nazerbaevesque desires to be president for life. CEO of Gazprom is a much better gig, as Gerhard Schroeder can attest.
* For further reading, the Institute for National Strategy of Ukraine authored an excellent analysis of the current gas situation.